Artikel
Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium in the game theory evolutionary set up. A complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labour market is provided.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: EconomiA ; ISSN: 1517-7580 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 41-53 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Informal Economy; Underground Economy
Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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Evolutionary game theory approach
Labour market
Informal economy
Lyapunov function
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo
Moreira, Helmar Nunes
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Elsevier
- (where)
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Amsterdam
- (when)
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2014
- DOI
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doi:10.1016/j.econ.2014.03.006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo
- Moreira, Helmar Nunes
- Elsevier
Time of origin
- 2014
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