Sticky wages in search and matching models in the short and long run

Arbeitspapier

This paper documents the short run and long run behavior of the search and matching model with staggered Nash wage bargaining. It turns out that there is a strong tradeoff inherent in assuming that previously bargained sticky wages apply to new hires. If sticky wages apply to new hires, then the staggered Nash bargaining model can generate realistic volatility in labor input, but it predicts a strong counterfactually negative long run relationship between inflation and unemployment. This finding is robust to including a microeconomically realistic degree of indexation of wages to inflation. The lack of a negative long run relationship between trend inflation and unemployment provides indirect evidence against the proposed mechanism that high inflation systematically makes new hiring more profitable by depressing the real wages of new hires.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1722

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Aggregate Factor Income Distribution ; Labor Demand ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• Thema: Sticky wages ; staggered Nash bargaining ; trend inflation ; unemployment ; search and matching ; Lohnrigidität ; Arbeitsuche ; Arbeitsmarkt ; Matching ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Inflation ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Schätzung ; Phillips-Kurve ; USA

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Reicher, Christopher Phillip
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49382
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ