Arbeitspapier

Epistemically stable strategy sets

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2010,01

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Epistemic game theory
epistemic stability
rationalizability
closedness under rational behavior
mutual p-belief
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Rationales Verhalten
Lernprozess
Spieltheorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Asheim, Geir B.
Voorneveld, Max
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Asheim, Geir B.
  • Voorneveld, Max
  • Weibull, Jörgen W.
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2010

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