Arbeitspapier
Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall
This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005-14
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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Bounded Rationality
Strategy Set Growth
Strategic Complexity
Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Repeated Games
Entropy
Soziale Beziehungen
Beschränkte Rationalität
Zeit
Wiederholte Spiele
Entropie
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Neyman, Abraham
Okada, Daijiro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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New Brunswick, NJ
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Neyman, Abraham
- Okada, Daijiro
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2005