Arbeitspapier

Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005-14

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
Bounded Rationality
Strategy Set Growth
Strategic Complexity
Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Repeated Games
Entropy
Soziale Beziehungen
Beschränkte Rationalität
Zeit
Wiederholte Spiele
Entropie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Neyman, Abraham
Okada, Daijiro
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
(where)
New Brunswick, NJ
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Neyman, Abraham
  • Okada, Daijiro
  • Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2005

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