Arbeitspapier

Why Is Unemployment Duration a Sorting Criterion in Hiring?

Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates' unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To this end, we conduct a lab experiment in which participants make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates with diverging unemployment durations. In addition, these participants rate the job candidates on statements central to four theoretical mechanisms often related to the scarring effect of unemployment: general signalling theory, (perceived) skill loss, queuing theory, and rational herding. We use the resulting data to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four theories. The lower hiring chances of the long-term unemployed turn out to be dominantly driven by the perception of longer unemployment spells as a signal of lower motivation. Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates' unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate the mechanisms underlying this pattern. To this end, we conduct a lab experiment in which participants make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates with diverging unemployment durations. In addition, these participants rate the job candidates on statements central to four theoretical mechanisms often related to the scarring effect of unemployment: general signalling theory, (perceived) skill loss, queuing theory, and rational herding. We use the resulting data to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four theories. The lower hiring chances of the long-term unemployed turn out to be dominantly driven by the perception of longer unemployment spells as a signal of lower motivation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10876

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Labor Demand
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
unemployment scarring
signalling theory
queuing theory
rational herding

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Van Belle, Eva
Caers, Ralf
De Couck, Marijke
Di Stasio, Valentina
Baert, Stijn
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Van Belle, Eva
  • Caers, Ralf
  • De Couck, Marijke
  • Di Stasio, Valentina
  • Baert, Stijn
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2017

Ähnliche Objekte (12)