Permutation-Based Hash Chains with Application to Password Hashing

Abstract: Hash chain based password systems are a useful way to guarantee authentication with one-time passwords. The core idea dates back to Lamport, and is specified in RFC 1760 as S/Key. At CCS 2017, Kogan et al. introduced T/Key, an improved password system where one-time passwords are only valid for a limited time period. They proved security of their construction in the random oracle model under a basic modeling of the adversary. In this work, we make various advances in the analysis and instantiation of hash chain based password systems. Firstly, we describe a slight abstraction called U/Key that allows for more flexibility in the instantiation and analysis, and we develop a security model that refines the adversarial strength into offline and online complexity, that can be used beyond the random oracle model, and that allows to argue multi-user security directly. Secondly, we derive a new security proof of U/Key in the random oracle model, as well as dedicated and tighter security pr.... https://ojs.ub.rub.de/index.php/ToSC/article/view/11955

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Permutation-Based Hash Chains with Application to Password Hashing ; volume:2024 ; number:4 ; year:2024 ; IACR transactions on symmetric cryptology ; 2024, Heft 4 (2024)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Lefevre, Charlotte ; Mennink, Bart

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.46586/tosc.v2024.i4.249-286
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2412181758586.739249015063
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ