Alliances in the shadow of conflict

Arbeitspapier

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2012-104

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: conflict ; contest ; alliance ; hold-up problem ; experiment ; Konflikt ; Bündnissystem ; Sunk Costs ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ke, Changxia ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Morath, Florian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET