Artikel

Contagion through learning

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of contagion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the outcomes generally differ.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2008 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 431-458 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Similarity
learning
contagion
case-based reasoning
global games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Steiner, Jakub
Stewart, Colin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Steiner, Jakub
  • Stewart, Colin
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2008

Ähnliche Objekte (12)