Why Moral Heuristics can Lead to Mistaken Moral Judgments
Abstract: Given the lack of generally accepted moral standards, one of the controversial questions for those who investigate moral heuristics is whether we can argue that moral heuristics can lead to mistaken moral judgments. This paper suggests that, even if we agree that moral standards are different and chosen subjectively, deviations from them are possible and we can prove such deviations in a logically correct way. However, in this case, it must be admitted that not every deviation is a mistake. Deviation becomes a mistake only when a person departs from the standard which she or he considers as right. There are cases where it is impossible to establish the fact of a mistake: when a person chooses a moral standard post hoc, in the light of which the decision would be right (only when there is a deviation from all moral standards which a person considers as right, it is possible to recognize the decision as mistaken). Accepting the idea of the subjectivity of a moral standard, it is also necessary to accept the idea of relativity of moral heuristics: the normative standard chosen by a person also determines which method of moral decision making will be considered as a heuristic.
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Why Moral Heuristics can Lead to Mistaken Moral Judgments ; volume:34 ; number:1 ; year:2020 ; pages:99-113 ; extent:15
Kriterion ; 34, Heft 1 (2020), 99-113 (gesamt 15)
- Urheber
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Nadurak, Vitaliy
- DOI
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10.1515/krt-2020-340106
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090315105834952693
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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15.08.2025, 07:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Nadurak, Vitaliy
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