Arbeitspapier

Incentives and group identity

This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have hidden costs, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In between-group interactions, agents perceive control more hostile once we condition on their beliefs about principal's behavior. Our finding contributes to the micro-foundation of psychological effects of incentives.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6815

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Thema
social identity
social preferences
incentives
motivation
crowding out
trust
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Masella, Paolo
Meier, Stephan
Zahn, Philipp
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Masella, Paolo
  • Meier, Stephan
  • Zahn, Philipp
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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