Arbeitspapier
Incentives and group identity
This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have hidden costs, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In between-group interactions, agents perceive control more hostile once we condition on their beliefs about principal's behavior. Our finding contributes to the micro-foundation of psychological effects of incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6815
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Thema
-
social identity
social preferences
incentives
motivation
crowding out
trust
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Masella, Paolo
Meier, Stephan
Zahn, Philipp
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Masella, Paolo
- Meier, Stephan
- Zahn, Philipp
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2012