Artikel
CEO bias and product substitutability in oligopoly games
We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of competition. We lay out the conditions under which it is profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases need not improve social welfare.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-23 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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behavioral economics
Bertrand model
Cournot model
Cournot-Bertrand model
firm objectives
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schroeder, Elizabeth
Tremblay, Carol Horton
Tremblay, Victor J.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2022
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g13020028
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Schroeder, Elizabeth
- Tremblay, Carol Horton
- Tremblay, Victor J.
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2022
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