Intimidating competitors: Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We examine the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and costreducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. We start from a linear Cournot model to motivate our more general reducedform framework. For this general framework, we establish the following main results: First, vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). Second, asymmetric equilibria typically involve integrated firms that invest more into efficiency than their separated counterparts. Our findings suggest that asymmetric vertical integration is a potential explanation for the initial difference between leader and laggard in investment games.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0409

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General ; Firm Organization and Market Structure
• Subject: vertically related oligopolies ; investment ; vertical integration ; cost reduction ; Vertikale Konzentration ; Investitionsentscheidung ; Oligopol ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Marktstruktur

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bühler, Stefan ; Schmutzler, Armin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76173
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET