Arbeitspapier

The myth of the lead arranger's share

We make use of Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data to examine syndicated loans in which the lead arranger retains no stake. We find that the lead arranger sells its entire loan share for 27 percent of term loans and 48 percent of Term B loans, typically shortly after syndication. In contrast to existing asymmetric information theories on the role of the lead share, we find that loans that are sold are less likely to become non-performing in the future. This result is robust to several different measures of loan performance and is reflected in subsequent secondary market prices. We explore syndicated loan underwriting risk as an alternative theory that may help explain this result.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 922

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Thema
syndicated lending
loan sales
lead arranger

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brickle, Kristian
Fleckenstein, Quirin
Hillenbrand, Sebastian
Saunders, Anthony
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brickle, Kristian
  • Fleckenstein, Quirin
  • Hillenbrand, Sebastian
  • Saunders, Anthony
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)