Arbeitspapier
The myth of the lead arranger's share
We make use of Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data to examine syndicated loans in which the lead arranger retains no stake. We find that the lead arranger sells its entire loan share for 27 percent of term loans and 48 percent of Term B loans, typically shortly after syndication. In contrast to existing asymmetric information theories on the role of the lead share, we find that loans that are sold are less likely to become non-performing in the future. This result is robust to several different measures of loan performance and is reflected in subsequent secondary market prices. We explore syndicated loan underwriting risk as an alternative theory that may help explain this result.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Staff Report ; No. 922
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
- Thema
-
syndicated lending
loan sales
lead arranger
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Brickle, Kristian
Fleckenstein, Quirin
Hillenbrand, Sebastian
Saunders, Anthony
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York
- (wo)
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New York, NY
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brickle, Kristian
- Fleckenstein, Quirin
- Hillenbrand, Sebastian
- Saunders, Anthony
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Entstanden
- 2020