Arbeitspapier

From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices

This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimising public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical findings, our model implies that firms in the competitive market provide stronger monetary incentives to workers, reach higher productivity, and employ less workers than the public firm. Allocative efficiency therefore increases. Nevertheless, prices of the sector's output rise as competition between private firms for the best motivated workers leads to higher wage cost than under the public monopsony. Political support for liberalisation may therefore be limited.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1095

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Particular Labor Markets: General
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Thema
liberalisation
monopsony power
incentive wages
intrinsic motivation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Delfgaauw, Josse
Dur, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Delfgaauw, Josse
  • Dur, Robert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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