Arbeitspapier
From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices
This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimising public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical findings, our model implies that firms in the competitive market provide stronger monetary incentives to workers, reach higher productivity, and employ less workers than the public firm. Allocative efficiency therefore increases. Nevertheless, prices of the sector's output rise as competition between private firms for the best motivated workers leads to higher wage cost than under the public monopsony. Political support for liberalisation may therefore be limited.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1095
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Particular Labor Markets: General
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
- Thema
-
liberalisation
monopsony power
incentive wages
intrinsic motivation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Delfgaauw, Josse
Dur, Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Delfgaauw, Josse
- Dur, Robert
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2003