Arbeitspapier
Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation
Using the self-selection approach to tax analysis, this paper derives a modified Samuelson Rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal non-linear income tax. This approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area, generalizes it , and provides a simple characterization of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 828
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Boadway, Robin
Keen, Michael
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
-
1991
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Boadway, Robin
- Keen, Michael
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1991
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