FaultDetective : Explainable to a Fault, from the Design Layout to the Software

Abstract: Hardware faults are a known source of security vulnerabilities. Fault injection in secure embedded systems leads to information leakage and privilege escalation, and countless fault attacks have been demonstrated both in simulation and in practice. However, there is a significant gap between simulated fault attacks and physical fault attacks. Simulations use idealized fault models such as single-bit flips with uniform distribution. These ideal fault models may not hold in practice. On the other hand, practical experiments lack the white-box visibility necessary to determine the true nature of the fault, leading to probabilistic vulnerability assessments and unexplained results. In embedded software, this problem is further exacerbated by the layered abstractions between the hardware (where the fault originates) and the application software (where the fault effect is observed). We present FaultDetective, a method to investigate the root-cause of fault injection from fault detection .... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11804

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
FaultDetective ; volume:2024 ; number:4 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 4 (2024)

Creator
Liu, Zhenyuan
Shanmugam, Dillibabu
Schaumont, Patrick

DOI
10.46586/tches.v2024.i4.610-632
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2409251854585.782551345309
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:26 AM CEST

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Associated

  • Liu, Zhenyuan
  • Shanmugam, Dillibabu
  • Schaumont, Patrick

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