FaultDetective : Explainable to a Fault, from the Design Layout to the Software
Abstract: Hardware faults are a known source of security vulnerabilities. Fault injection in secure embedded systems leads to information leakage and privilege escalation, and countless fault attacks have been demonstrated both in simulation and in practice. However, there is a significant gap between simulated fault attacks and physical fault attacks. Simulations use idealized fault models such as single-bit flips with uniform distribution. These ideal fault models may not hold in practice. On the other hand, practical experiments lack the white-box visibility necessary to determine the true nature of the fault, leading to probabilistic vulnerability assessments and unexplained results. In embedded software, this problem is further exacerbated by the layered abstractions between the hardware (where the fault originates) and the application software (where the fault effect is observed). We present FaultDetective, a method to investigate the root-cause of fault injection from fault detection .... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11804
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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FaultDetective ; volume:2024 ; number:4 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 4 (2024)
- Urheber
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Liu, Zhenyuan
Shanmugam, Dillibabu
Schaumont, Patrick
- DOI
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10.46586/tches.v2024.i4.610-632
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2409251854585.782551345309
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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15.08.2025, 07:26 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Liu, Zhenyuan
- Shanmugam, Dillibabu
- Schaumont, Patrick