Arbeitspapier

Non-standard choice in matching markets

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior that is consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 22-054

Classification: Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design

Subject: Matching Theory
Market Design
Stability
College Admissions Market

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Caspari, Gian
Khanna, Manshu

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung

(where): Mannheim

(when): 2022

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/266644

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Caspari, Gian
Khanna, Manshu
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung

Time of origin

2022

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