Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case

Arbeitspapier

This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of enforceability of compliance result in an incentive problem. A reform of the European supervisory system complemented by strengthening market discipline based on improved disclosure of both the supervisor and the banks may help to solve the European incentive problem.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 03-62

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
• Thema: banking regulation and supervision ; principal-agent ; European Union ; Bankenaufsicht ; Wahlverhalten ; Bank ; Agency Theory ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; EU-Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schüler, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23996
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ