International tax competition: Zero tax rate at the top re-established

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we extend the zero tax at the top result obtained in the closed economy case with bounded skill distributions for the case of unbounded skill distributions in the presence of international labor mobility and tax competition. We show that in the equilibrium for the tax competition game the optimal marginal income tax rate converges to zero as the income level tends to infinity. We further show in simulations that the zero marginal tax result is not a local property: over a large range at the higher end of the income distribution, the optimal tax is approximately given by a lump-sum tax set at its Laffer rate. We further show that the range in which the optimal marginal tax is approximately set to zero is widening as migration costs decrease.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3820

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Welfare Economics: General ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
• Subject: tax competition ; migration ; zero marginal tax at the top ; Einkommensteuer ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Internationale Arbeitsmobilität ; Reichtum ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Blumkin, Tomer ; Sadka, Efraim ; Shem-Tov, Yotam
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58334
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET