Arbeitspapier

International tax competition: Zero tax rate at the top re-established

In this paper we extend the zero tax at the top result obtained in the closed economy case with bounded skill distributions for the case of unbounded skill distributions in the presence of international labor mobility and tax competition. We show that in the equilibrium for the tax competition game the optimal marginal income tax rate converges to zero as the income level tends to infinity. We further show in simulations that the zero marginal tax result is not a local property: over a large range at the higher end of the income distribution, the optimal tax is approximately given by a lump-sum tax set at its Laffer rate. We further show that the range in which the optimal marginal tax is approximately set to zero is widening as migration costs decrease.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3820

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Thema
tax competition
migration
zero marginal tax at the top
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Steuerwettbewerb
Internationale Arbeitsmobilität
Reichtum
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Blumkin, Tomer
Sadka, Efraim
Shem-Tov, Yotam
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Blumkin, Tomer
  • Sadka, Efraim
  • Shem-Tov, Yotam
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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