Dual governance in state-owned banks

Arbeitspapier

State-owned enterprises set a clear example of a mixed governance, in which the public and private realms blend together to bring about a complex structure we are going to define as dual governance. This paper puts forth a new design of governance for state-owned banks. Firstly, the whole subject is framed within the transaction costs approach to financial intermediation. Next, we move on to the formal governance of state-owned banks. Afterwards, we focus on dual governance and expand on agency problems that arise from the fiduciary role, accountability, transparency, rent-seeking and soft-budget constraints. The paper's proposal hinges upon the subsidiarity portfolio, to which the state-owned bank should manage as a trustee only, so that dual governance could be enhanced. We conclude bringing forth a minimal set of dual governance principles.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 319

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
• Subject: governance ; public governance ; dual governance ; state-owned banks ; subsidiarity ; Öffentliches Unternehmen ; Bank ; Finanzintermediation ; Transaktionskosten ; Governance-Ansatz

Contributors, Location and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Apreda, Rodolfo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
• (where): Buenos Aires
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84255
• Last update: 20.09.2024, 8:21 AM CEST