Arbeitspapier

A theory of autocratic transition: Prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy

This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions of self-enforcing democracy by analyzing the recent wave of autocratic transitions. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we work out the conditions under which governments may induce the diverse public authorities to coordinate on extra-constitutional activities, eventually transforming the politico-institutional setting into one of autocratic rule. We find three empirically testable characteristics that promote this coordination process, namely: populism and public support, corruption, and a lack in the separation of powers. By contrast, low degrees of corruption and strongly separated powers can be viewed as prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CIW Discussion Paper ; No. 1/2018

Classification
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Apolte, Thomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW)
(where)
Münster
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Apolte, Thomas
  • Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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