Arbeitspapier

Stochastic income and conditional generosity

We study how other-regarding behavior extends to environments with uncertain income and conditional commitments. Should fundraisers ask a banker to donate "if he earns a bonus" or wait and ask after the bonus is known? Standard EU theory predicts these are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models both predict a larger commitment before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In field and lab experiments, we allow people to donate from lottery winnings, varying whether they decide before or after learning the lottery's outcome. Males are more generous when making conditional donations before knowing the outcome, while females' donations are unaffected. Males also commit more in treatments where income is certain but the donation's collection is uncertain. This supports a signaling explanation: it is cheaper to commit to donate before the uncertainty is unresolved, thus a larger donation is required to maintain a positive image. This has implications for experimental methodology, for fundraisers, and for our understanding of pro-social behavior.

ISBN
978-3-86304-196-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 197

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Expectations; Speculations
Thema
social preferences
contingent decision-making
signaling
uncertainty
prospect theory
affective state
gender
charitable giving
public goods
experiments
field experiments
bonuses

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kellner, Christian
Reinstein, David
Riener, Gerhard
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kellner, Christian
  • Reinstein, David
  • Riener, Gerhard
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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