Violence against civilians in civil wars: Looting or terror?

Arbeitspapier

A simple two-stage game-theoretic model of conflict is analysed, where the government can send raiders for terrorising the population to flee before the fighting proper begins. The resulting displacement of population reduces the efficiency of the guerrilla in the fight against the government. Conditions are spelled out for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to exist where terror substitutes for fighting, when the government can afford it. The model’s predictions are tested using data on refugees in Africa, showing that, after controlling for war, ODA has a positive impact on the outflow of refugees, as predicted.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2001/46

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions ; Noncooperative Games ; Economywide Country Studies: Africa
• Subject: civil war ; Africa ; game theory ; refugees ; Bürgerkrieg ; Gewalt ; Flüchtlinge ; Spieltheorie ; Theorie ; Afrika

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Azam, Jean-Paul ; Hoeffler, Anke
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53087
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET