Arbeitspapier

Violence against civilians in civil wars: Looting or terror?

A simple two-stage game-theoretic model of conflict is analysed, where the government can send raiders for terrorising the population to flee before the fighting proper begins. The resulting displacement of population reduces the efficiency of the guerrilla in the fight against the government. Conditions are spelled out for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to exist where terror substitutes for fighting, when the government can afford it. The model’s predictions are tested using data on refugees in Africa, showing that, after controlling for war, ODA has a positive impact on the outflow of refugees, as predicted.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2001/46

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
Noncooperative Games
Economywide Country Studies: Africa
Thema
civil war
Africa
game theory
refugees
Bürgerkrieg
Gewalt
Flüchtlinge
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Afrika

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Azam, Jean-Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Azam, Jean-Paul
  • Hoeffler, Anke
  • The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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