Arbeitspapier
Paying Attention to Payoffs in Analogy-Based Learning
This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy-based expectation equilibrium (PCABEE) as a way to refine the set of analogy-based equilibria and the associated admissible analogy partitions. In addition to the actions of others, own payoff history provides information about others' strategies but, yet, non-Bayesian Nash equilibria may exist both with an incorrect and a correct prior. We provide general conditions when this happens. Two stylized employer-employee interactions, one with a correct and one with an incorrect prior, are provided illustrating how PCABEE can be used to analyze robust stereotypes and how incorrect such stereotypes may lead to discrimination.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SITE Working Paper ; No. 7
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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analogy expectations
bounded rationality
curse
learning
discrimination
stereotypes
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Miettinen, Topi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
- (where)
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Stockholm
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Miettinen, Topi
- Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
Time of origin
- 2009