Arbeitspapier

Paying Attention to Payoffs in Analogy-Based Learning

This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy-based expectation equilibrium (PCABEE) as a way to refine the set of analogy-based equilibria and the associated admissible analogy partitions. In addition to the actions of others, own payoff history provides information about others' strategies but, yet, non-Bayesian Nash equilibria may exist both with an incorrect and a correct prior. We provide general conditions when this happens. Two stylized employer-employee interactions, one with a correct and one with an incorrect prior, are provided illustrating how PCABEE can be used to analyze robust stereotypes and how incorrect such stereotypes may lead to discrimination.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SITE Working Paper ; No. 7

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
analogy expectations
bounded rationality
curse
learning
discrimination
stereotypes

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Miettinen, Topi
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Miettinen, Topi
  • Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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