Arbeitspapier

Workers' participation in wage setting and opportnistic behaviour: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment

Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers' involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers' participation leads actually to a decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some recently observed positive effects from workers' participation in experimental labor markets into perspective and are more in line with the ambiguous results from empirical studies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07/2014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Organization of Production
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
Thema
Participation
labor market
gift-exchange game
personnel economics
reciprocity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Franke, Jörg
Gurtoviy, Ruslan
Mertins, Vanessa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
(wo)
Trier
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Franke, Jörg
  • Gurtoviy, Ruslan
  • Mertins, Vanessa
  • University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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