Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256

Abstract: TinyJAMBU is one of the finalists in the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. It is considered to be one of the more efficient ciphers in the competition and has undergone extensive analysis in recent years as both the keyed permutation as well as the mode are new designs. In this paper we present a related-key forgery attack on the updated TinyJAMBU-v2 scheme with 256- and 192-bit keys. We introduce a high probability related-key differential attack where the differences are only introduced into the key state. Therefore, the characteristic is applicable to the TinyJAMBU mode and can be used to mount a forgery attack. The time and data complexity of the forgery are 233 using 214 related-keys for the 256-bit key version, and 243 using 216 related-keys for the 192-bit key version. For the 128-bit key we construct a related-key differential characteristic on the full keyed permutation of TinyJAMBU with a probability of 2−16. We extend the relatedkey differential characteristics .... https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/10982

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Practical Related-Key Forgery Attacks on Full-Round TinyJAMBU-192/256 ; volume:2023 ; number:2 ; year:2023 ; IACR transactions on symmetric cryptology ; 2023, Heft 2 (2023)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Dunkelman, Orr ; Ghosh, Shibam ; Lambooij, Eran

Further information

• DOI: 10.46586/tosc.v2023.i2.176-188
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023102518555583008047
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:47 AM CEST