Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?

Arbeitspapier

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the 'most' stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers ; No. 375

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Cooperative Games
• Subject: Coalition formation ; Shapley value ; Simple games ; Winning coalitions ; Regierungswechsel ; Regierungskoalition ; Parlament ; Shapley-Wert ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dimitrov, Dinko ; Haake, Claus-Jochen
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (where): Bielefeld
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43759
• URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8217
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET