Arbeitspapier
Who Should Pay for Certification?
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer ' the seller ' follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence seller-induced certification acts as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets - in particular the financial market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 323
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
asymmetric information
certi?cation
information acquisition
inspection
lemons
middlemen
signaling
Standardisierung
Produktqualität
Asymmetrische Information
Kunden
Kosten
Signalling
Kraftfahrzeugindustrie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stahl, Konrad
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13231
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13231-2
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stahl, Konrad
- Strausz, Roland
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2010