Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we study the behavior of rivals when there is a known probability of imminent entry. Experimental markets are used to collect data on pre- and post-entry production when there is an announced time of possible entry; some markets experience entry and other do not. In all pre-entry markets competition is more intense. Post-entry behavior in all markets is more competitive compared to a baseline that had no threat. There is evidence that post-entry multimarket contact raises outputs in those markets that did not experience entry, behavior we generally refer to as a conduit effect.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5853

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Design of Experiments: General
• Thema: entry ; rivalry ; market experiments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Mason, Charles F. ; Phillips, Owen R.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130478
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ