Arbeitspapier

Costly external finance and investment efficiency in a market equilibrium model

The corporate finance literature suggests that a financially constrained firm invests less than an identical unconstrained firm. This does not imply that financial frictions cause firms to invest less than they would in a frictionless economy. When firms compete for investment funds, an increase in financial frictions can lead individual firms to increase their investment levels. A greater than the frictionless level of investment is likely in low productivity firms, in cash-rich firms, and in firms with cheap external capital. Government programs that make capital cheaper for small firms may lead to lower levels of investment for all firms and decrease efficiency.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1160

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Thema
Financial Frictions
Investment Distortions
Betriebliche Investitionspolitik
Betriebliche Liquidität
Unternehmensfinanzierung
Fremdkapital
Rentabilität
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Zabojnik, Jan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Zabojnik, Jan
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

Ähnliche Objekte (12)