Artikel

Weighted scoring committees

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many different weights induce the same mapping from committee members' preferences to winning candidates. The numbers of respective weight equivalence classes and hence of structurally distinct plurality committees, Borda commitees, etc. differ widely. There are 6, 51, and 5 plurality, Borda, and antiplurality committees, respectively, if three players choose between three candidates and up to 163 (229) committees for scoring rules in between plurality and Borda (Borda and antiplurality). A key implication is that plurality, Borda, and antiplurality rule are much less sensitive to weight changes than other scoring rules. We illustrate the geometry of weight equivalence classes, with a map of all Borda classes, and identify minimal integer representations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-17 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Cooperative Games
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
Thema
collective choice
scoring rules
simple voting games
weighted committee games
weighted voting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mayer, Alexander
Napel, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3390/g12040094
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Mayer, Alexander
  • Napel, Stefan
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2021

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