Arbeitspapier

The Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules

A q-rule is where, for n-voters, a winning coalition consists of q or more voters. An important question is to determine when, generically, core points exist; that is, when the core exists in other than highly contrived settings. As known, the answer depends upon the dimension of issue space. McKelvey and Schofield found bounds on these dimensions, but Banks found a subtle, but critical error in their proofs. The sharp dimensional values along with results about the structure of the core are derived.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1113

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Saari, Donald G.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
1994

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Saari, Donald G.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 1994

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