Arbeitspapier
The Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules
A q-rule is where, for n-voters, a winning coalition consists of q or more voters. An important question is to determine when, generically, core points exist; that is, when the core exists in other than highly contrived settings. As known, the answer depends upon the dimension of issue space. McKelvey and Schofield found bounds on these dimensions, but Banks found a subtle, but critical error in their proofs. The sharp dimensional values along with results about the structure of the core are derived.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1113
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Saari, Donald G.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1994
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Saari, Donald G.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1994