Authorized Generic Entry prior to Patent Expiry: Reassessing Incentives for Independent Generic Entry

Arbeitspapier

Patent holders attempt to mitigate the loss of monopoly power by authorizing generic entry prior to patent expiry (early entry). Off-patent competition may be adversely affected if early entry substantially lowers the attractiveness of subsequent generic entry. This study assesses the impact of early entry, examining generic entry decisions made in the course of recent patent expiries. Using micro data and accounting for the endogeneity of early entry, I estimate recursive bivariate probit models of entry. Early entry has no significant impact on the likelihood of generic entry. Rent-seeking rather than strategic entry-deterrence motives drive early entry decisions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 357

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Analysis of Health Care Markets ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
• Thema: Generic Entry ; Early Entry ; Anticompetitive Practices ; Pharmazeutische Industrie ; Lizenz ; Generika ; Markteintritt ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Rent-Seeking ; Schätzung ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Appelt, Silvia
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13197
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93922
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13197-8
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ