Aufsatzsammlung

Differential information economies

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues ofstability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. TOC:Core Notions, Existence Results.- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence.- Core and Incentive Compatibility.- Continuity and Stability.- Value Allocations and the Bargaining Set.- Implementation.

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
ISBN
9783540214243
3540214240
Dimensions
24 cm
Extent
XIII, 650 S.
Language
Englisch
Notes
graph. Darst.
Literaturangaben

Bibliographic citation
Studies in economic theory ; 19

Classification
Wirtschaft
Keyword
Informationsökonomie
Gleichgewichtstheorie
Spieltheorie

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Berlin, Heidelberg, New York
(who)
Springer
(when)
2005
Contributor
Glycopantis, Dionysius

Table of contents
Rights
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Last update
11.06.2025, 1:58 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Aufsatzsammlung

Associated

  • Glycopantis, Dionysius
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2005

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