Artikel

Routing-proofness in congestion-prone networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to connect, and charges agents based on their demands. We look for a cost-sharing mechanism that satisfies three desirable properties: efficiency which charges agents based on the minimum total cost of connecting them in a network, stand-alone core stability which requires charging agents not more than the cost of connecting by themselves directly, and limit routing-proofness which prevents agents from profitable reporting as several agents connecting from A to C to B instead of A to B. We show that these three properties are not always compatible for any set of cost functions and demands. However, when these properties are compatible, a new egalitarian mechanism is shown to satisfy them. When the properties are not compatible, we find a rule that meets stand-alone core stability, limit routing-proofness and minimizes the budget deficit.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-18 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
cost sharing
core stability
routing proofness

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Juarez, Ruben
Wu, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3390/g10020017
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Juarez, Ruben
  • Wu, Michael
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2019

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