Being for no-one : Psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity

Abstract: Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder (DPD). However, Billon & Kriegel (2015) have defended SP by arguing (inter alia) that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus do not constitute genuine counterexamples to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: (a) phenomenal co.... https://www.philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/47

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Being for no-one ; volume:1 ; number:I ; day:20 ; month:02 ; year:2020 ; Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 1, Heft I (20.02.2020)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Chris Letheby

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.47
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020051409552419182194
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 14.08.2025, 10:44 MESZ