How did Feldstein (1985) undervalue the optimal level of social security benefits?

Arbeitspapier

In his seminal model (Feldstein, 1985), the government operates a social security system to counter the representative worker's myopia. (i) For a complete myope, he determined a sizable optimal tax rate (and the corresponding benefit level). (ii) For a partially shortsighted worker, he determined another optimum, which was much lower, possibly zero. Departing from Feldstein, I take into account that neither a paternalistic government nor a cautious bank tolerates long-term negative saving, and then even in (ii), the government may choose the first rather than the second optimum. Having revised it, Feldstein's model regains its place in the textbooks.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-615-5457-12-8
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2017/22

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Household Behavior: General ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth ; Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination ; Demographic Economics: Public Policy ; Retirement; Retirement Policies
• Thema: social security ; myopia ; paternalism ; social welfare

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Simonovits, András
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
• (wo): Budapest
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190483
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ