- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1874-6349
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths ; day:4 ; month:7 ; year:2018 ; pages:1-22
Acta analytica ; (4.7.2018), 1-22
- Classification
-
Philosophie
- Creator
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s12136-018-0360-9
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018091213164878850578
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:28 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Collin, James Henry
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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