Arbeitspapier

Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics

We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race; and that this adverse selection effect can be prevented if the entry stage is made transparent to voters.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10258

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
candidates
elections
campaigns
primaries
contest
voting
political economy
experiment
lying aversion
self-selection
cheap talk

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fehrler, Sebastian
Fischbacher, Urs
Schneider, Maik T.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fehrler, Sebastian
  • Fischbacher, Urs
  • Schneider, Maik T.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2016

Ähnliche Objekte (12)