Arbeitspapier
Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics
We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race; and that this adverse selection effect can be prevented if the entry stage is made transparent to voters.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10258
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
candidates
elections
campaigns
primaries
contest
voting
political economy
experiment
lying aversion
self-selection
cheap talk
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehrler, Sebastian
Fischbacher, Urs
Schneider, Maik T.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehrler, Sebastian
- Fischbacher, Urs
- Schneider, Maik T.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2016