Arbeitspapier

The implications of central bank transparency for uncertainty and disagreement

Using survey data from 25 economies we provide evidence that greater transparency surrounding monetary policy reduces uncertainty of interest rates and inflation, primarily by reducing uncertainty that is common to agents rather than disagreement between agents. This suggests that studies that focus on disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty understate the benefits of monetary policy transparency. The adoption of inflation targets and forward guidance are both associated with lower uncertainty, although inflation targets have a stronger impact on reducing uncertainty than forward guidance. Moreover, there are diminishing benefits from ever higher levels of transparency. Taken as a whole, our results support the contention that clarity of communication is as important as the magnitude of transparency.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 445

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Central bank transparency
Uncertainty
Disagreement
Monetary policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Boonlert Jitmaneeroj
Lamla, Michael J.
Wood, Andrew
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000305642
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Boonlert Jitmaneeroj
  • Lamla, Michael J.
  • Wood, Andrew
  • ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute

Time of origin

  • 2018

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