Arbeitspapier

Composition of supervisory boards in Germany: Inside or outside control of banks?

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members are representatives of other banks and industrial companies. The high presence of former executives and German board members indicates inside control. In banks controlled by other banks or insurance companies it is less likely that the chairperson of the supervisory board is a former executive of the same bank. Over time, inside networking through the supervisory board decreased.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory - Working Paper ; No. 103

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Subject
corporate governance
dual board system
principal agent theory
stakeholder theory
banks
Bank
Aufsichtsrat
Eigentümerstruktur
Soziales Netzwerk
Corporate Governance
Stakeholder

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andreani, Ettore
Dummann, Kathrin
Neuberger, Doris
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Rostock, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
(where)
Rostock
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Andreani, Ettore
  • Dummann, Kathrin
  • Neuberger, Doris
  • Universität Rostock, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Time of origin

  • 2009

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