Composition of supervisory boards in Germany: Inside or outside control of banks?

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members are representatives of other banks and industrial companies. The high presence of former executives and German board members indicates inside control. In banks controlled by other banks or insurance companies it is less likely that the chairperson of the supervisory board is a former executive of the same bank. Over time, inside networking through the supervisory board decreased.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory - Working Paper ; No. 103

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Thema: corporate governance ; dual board system ; principal agent theory ; stakeholder theory ; banks ; Bank ; Aufsichtsrat ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Corporate Governance ; Stakeholder

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andreani, Ettore ; Dummann, Kathrin ; Neuberger, Doris
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Rostock, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (wo): Rostock
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39726
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ