Arbeitspapier

Labor in the boardroom

We estimate the effects of a mandate allocating a third of corporate board seats to workers (shared governance). We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for new firm cohorts but locked it in for incumbents. Rejecting the canonical hold-up prediction - that increasing labor's power reduces owners' investment incentives - we find positive effects on capital formation. Shared governance does not measurably raise wages or rent sharing, nor does it lower profitability or debt capacity. It lowers outsourcing. The evidence is consistent with richer models of industrial relations whereby shared governance institutionalizes communication and repeated interactions between labor and capital.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IAB-Discussion Paper ; No. 8/2020

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Labor Law
Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Thema
Codetermination
Corporate Governance
Industrial Relations
Investments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jäger, Simon
Schoefer, Benjamin
Heining, Jörg
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)
(wo)
Nürnberg
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jäger, Simon
  • Schoefer, Benjamin
  • Heining, Jörg
  • Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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