Arbeitspapier

Auctions for public construction with corner-cutting

This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that winning bids and qualities of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. The experimental results support that firms with zeroinitial cash balance win and that the winning bids and the qualities of the constructed buildings are considerably low.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 740

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Auctions
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Corner-cutting
Public procurement
First-price auction
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Akai, Kenju
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Akai, Kenju
  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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