Arbeitspapier
Auctions for public construction with corner-cutting
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that winning bids and qualities of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. The experimental results support that firms with zeroinitial cash balance win and that the winning bids and the qualities of the constructed buildings are considerably low.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 740
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Auctions
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
Corner-cutting
Public procurement
First-price auction
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Akai, Kenju
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Akai, Kenju
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2009