Arbeitspapier

The Roommate Problem - Is More Stable Than You Think

Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types). As a consequence, when the number of individuals of any given type is large enough there always exist "quasi-stable" matchings: a stable matching can be restored with minimal policy intervention. Our results build on an analogy with an associated bipartite problem; it follows that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to the roommate problem.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4676

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chiappori, Pierre-André
Galichon, Alfred
Salanié, Bernard
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chiappori, Pierre-André
  • Galichon, Alfred
  • Salanié, Bernard
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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