Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Arbeitspapier

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4782

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Labor Contracts ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Labor Management ; Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
• Thema: Reciprocity ; social exchange ; incentive contracts ; double moral hazard ; GSOEP ; Anreizvertrag ; Verantwortung ; Moral Hazard ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dur, Robert ; Non, Arjan ; Roelfsema, Hein
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ