Arbeitspapier

Mandated benefits, welfare, and heterogeneous firms

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers? insurance, and may also redistribute in favor of more "deserving" workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts - separating the various worker types - the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be mitigated by restricting mandates to "large" firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision may be superior to mandates by virtue of preserving separations.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 98-46

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Betriebliche Sozialleistungen
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
Betriebsgröße
Sozialpolitik
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Addison, John T.
Barrett, Charles Richard
Siebert, William Stanley
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
1998

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Addison, John T.
  • Barrett, Charles Richard
  • Siebert, William Stanley
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Time of origin

  • 1998

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