International Mergers with Financially Constrained Owners

Arbeitspapier

This paper proposes a cross-border M&A model with financially constrained owners in which the identity of the buyer and seller can be determined. We show that policies blocking foreign acquisitions to protect the domestic industry can be counterproductive. Foreign acquisition can increase the domestic owner’s investment in growth industries by reducing their financial restrictions. This calls for a ”financial” efficiency defense in the merger law. We also show that cross-border M&As are not only driven by effects on the merged entity, but also driven by the seller’s alternative investment opportunities.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 927

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Antitrust Law ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
• Thema: Investment Liberalization ; Mergers & Acquisitions ; Corporate Governance ; Ownership

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Berg, Aron ; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan ; Persson, Lars
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81336
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ