Voluntary environmental agreements and competition policy: The case of Germany's private system for packaging waste recycling

Arbeitspapier

The paper takes the viewpoint of the neoinstitutional theory of the firm to analyse Germany's voluntary Dual Management System for Packaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD); namely, its governance structure and its contractual relations with upstream and downstream firms. Two aspects crucial for assessing the antitrust implications of voluntary environmental agreements are highlighted. First, the institutional fine-tuning of a voluntary agreement matters when assessing its implications for market competition. Second, the design of the threat with respect to the instruments it prescribes is of crucial importance for the degree of centralisation and the anti-competitive impact of the private institutions that subsequently emerge.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 78. 2000

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
• Subject: Voluntary environmental agreements ; antitrust ; theory of the firm ; waste management ; Verpackungs-Recycling ; Selbstverpflichtung ; Konzentrationspolitik ; Wettbewerbspolitik ; Theorie der Unternehmung ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lehmann, Markus A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155131
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET